Six crucial months will tip the scales for the new nuclear agreement; After a recount of votes in several locations and court, rulings left no room for doubt. After the electoral college was confirmed, Washington will wake up after the night of January 20 to a new era. It is clear from the statements of US President-elect Joe Biden during his election campaign, and even more so from the interviews, he has given since his election that he plans to bring a new spirit to the White House. Politics related to the Corona epidemic, climate change, trade, nuclear issues, and Iran are all expecting a change under the new administration and perhaps from the first days.
Although many people are eagerly awaiting the new reality under President-elect Biden about Iran, the timetables are very tight. With President Donald Trump entering the last month of his term as president, the sand in his hourglass is running out. The sand in the hourglass for the government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is running out, as the presidential elections there in June 2021 approaches. Rouhani cannot run for the third time. And his successor has not yet been determined, although the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s eye spotted Saeed Muhammad, the building block leader “Khatam al-Anbiya.
Announcing Joe Biden’s victory means that the race for a new nuclear deal has begun for all players in the region. In the six months from January through June, the concerned international players will do their utmost to influence the agreement being drawn up because those who do not speak now will have to remain silent forever. Hence, all players try to take advantage of this timeframe.
In this sense, the transitional period between the two presidents, and the increasing expectations of Biden’s presidency, even though Trump Republicans in the Senate still hope to change the direction of winds’ directionixth of next month related to windmills, is very important.
The first shot began with the expulsion of the great nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh by those who wanted to write the new rules for negotiations in blood. Europe was quick to congratulate Biden even before the official results appeared, and it has already begun to recalculate its course. European countries are likely to take advantage of this period to test the waters and transmit informal messages to Tehran and Washington through various channels in preparation for a new dialogue.
In this way, Europe hopes to facilitate and accelerate the commencement of negotiations between the Biden administration and Iran for rapid breakthroughs before Iran’s elections. European interests are simple: to assuage international concerns and follow up where the contacts stopped, returning to the JCPOA. However, Iran revealed its dark face that does not seem to be willing to change, as it bombed an oil tanker near the port of Jeddah in the name of the Houthis to cause closure and endanger international shipping across the Red Sea, as well as its kidnapping of the Iranian opposition journalist Ruhollah Zam, who was a refugee in France. He was executed at a time when the Europeans were preparing to hold an economic conference with Iran. Were it not for the campaign that has covered the world in condemnation of this crime; the conference would have been held.
However, the wave of publications and opinion articles in the United States shows that negotiations have already begun. People in various camps in the United States send out test balloons to promote their positions and recruit support for them.
What can be inferred from this? Democrats are debating how to deal with Iran and how long Trump’s maximum pressure campaign should last. The Iranian leadership also understands the opportunity that has arisen, that it would like to see the United States turn sharply from the policy of pressure it exerts towards concessions, lifting sanctions, and future rapprochement despite the existence of a comprehensive agreement, if Iran abides by it provides it with many windows and opportunities. Still, the various political parties In Iran differ from each other.
Overall, Iran feels the momentum is positive. She was anxious for Trump to fall, and this has happened. There is a campaign of initiatives to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table to increase their negotiating cards on the nuclear issue. Rouhani realizes the shortage of time and thus feels he must do everything in his power to capitalize on the parties’ strong drive to reach a broad-based interim agreement. Rouhani will use the transitional period to define the framework for negotiations that would dictate the remaining participants’ limits. Rouhani is already trying to present a complex Iranian policy that, on the one hand, offers strict preconditions, including the lifting of all sanctions and obtaining compensation and economic guarantees that prevent future withdrawal from the agreement. On the other hand, it shows a willingness to conduct a settlement dialogue.
The reform side of the political map in Tehran will seek to speed up negotiations under Rouhani. The reformist bloc believes that its most important diplomatic achievement is the nuclear agreement signed in 2015 that guarantees the regime’s survival and stability. Rouhani will promote the negotiations that are being forged while emphasizing the anticipated economic benefits, which are especially important to Iran’s severe economic crisis.
On the one hand, the hard-line camp of principle is expected to make it difficult for Rouhani to reach another agreement. The hardliners believe that these negotiations are a way to achieve economic relief that will give Iran an outlet of time and continue negotiations. They believe that in this way, Iran can continue to accumulate bargaining chips that will improve its position in the negotiations, and thus lead to more important achievements than Those that Rouhani would have satisfied with.
In the middle of the two camps, the Supreme Leader will try to maneuver between them and overcome his basic opposition to holding a dialogue with the United States, especially after his fears were proven correct when it withdrew from the agreement. He also has reservations about granting Rouhani and the reformist camp an important achievement shortly before the presidential elections.
Whether Iran chooses the fast lane or the long lane, the economy is an important major issue. The West and the regime view the Iranian economic situation as having a decisive effect on the internal arena. Thus it affects the regime’s willingness to accept or oppose settlements in the upcoming negotiations. The leadership certainly does not want more mass protests in the streets, and its strong desire to improve its economy is the main weakness of the Iranian situation. It would be wise for the Biden administration and the international community to use it wisely in negotiations.
The next six months will witness developments on the international scene, in the diplomatic field, and perhaps in other fields. Other powers outside the region should not be allowed to use this time to define the political and regional agendas. Everyone who has interests in this issue must actually intervene to curb Iran’s influence and influence the Biden administration to achieve positive results on Iran’s critical issues, first and foremost, nuclear issues, and then regional security measures to curb Iranian aggression. Although six months seems like a long period during which many things can be done, compared to history, it is not more than a moment, but a very decisive moment that will resonate with events in the region and beyond for many years.